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RECENT CASES
persons. 16 Therefore, the Court could possibly uphold a provision which pro-
vides for loss of citizenship where an American voluntarily assumes the
citizenship of another country,10 6 for the person would not become stateless.
Yet not inconceivable is the probability that the Court meant precisely what
it stated: that every citizen, under all circumstances, has a constitutional right
to remain a citizen until he specifically and voluntarily renounces that citizen-
ship.
ALAN R, FELDSTEIN
CRIMINAL LAW-NEw YORK "STOP AND FRISK" STATUTE HELD CON-
STITUTIONAL IN THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST
A police officer received an anonymous telephone call informing him that
a youth with a loaded revolver in his left-hand jacket pocket was standing on a
certain corner. A detailed description of the youth was given. The policeman
proceeded to the stated location and saw a boy, who matched the description
given him by the caller, standing among a group of children. There was nothing
in the youth's appearance to indicate that he was carrying a gun, and the detec-
tive had never seen or arrested him before. The officer approached the boy,
placed him against a wall, and withdrew a loaded revolver from the youth's
left-hand jacket pocket. Subsequently the defendant was indicted for violation
of section 265.05 of the New York Penal Code. A motion to suppress evidence
seized at the time of the arrest as constitutionally inadmissible was denied, the
trial court ruling that the requirement of probable cause for arrest had been
satisfied. The defendant was thereafter convicted upon a plea of guilty. The
conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Term, Second Depart-
ment, one judge dissenting. The New York Court of Appeals, while conceding
that probable cause for arrest was not present, also affirmed, holding that under
the "stop and frisk" amendment to the New York Code of Criminal Procedure
(section 180-a), the search and subsequent seizure were constitutionally valid.
People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 229 N.E.2d 581, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects
the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.1
A search or seizure is reasonable, within the meaning of this amendment, if
made pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause,2 or, in the absence of
such warrant, if made with consent,8 in "hot pursuit,"4 or incident to a lawful
105. Afroyin v. Rusk, 587 U.S. at 268,
106. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (1964). This provision states that a national of
the United States shall lose his nationality by "obtaining naturalization in a foreign state
upon his own application . .. "
1. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a).
3. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
4. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. . 294 (1967).
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arrest.5 An arrest is lawful only if based upon probable cause.0 Probable cause
is an objective standard which is satisfied when those facts and circumstances
known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest are deemed sufficient to
warrant a belief, in a man of reasonable caution and prudence, that a crime
has been, is being, or will be committed.7 In order to effectively protect the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Supreme Court formulated the
federal exclusionary rule,8 which prohibits the admission of any evidence ob-
tained in the course of an unreasonable search and seizure in a criminal action
against the person from whom it was seized. In 1961 this rule was made binding
upon the states in the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio.-
In an effort to aid police in the detection and prevention of crime, some
states, either by statute or otherwise, permit law enforcement officials, in the
absence of probable cause, to stop and question persons whom they reasonably
suspect are involved in criminal activity.10 These states further allow a search
of an individual so detained, where the officer reasonably suspects he is in
personal danger." The Uniform Arrest Act,'12 which has been adopted in some-
what modified forms by eight states,' 3 provides for both the stopping and ques-
tioning of individuals under the above stated circumstances, and such police
behavior is standard practice in all urban areas.1
4
In Commonwealth v. Hicks,'5 a police officer, investigating a burglary,
stopped and questioned a man who had been walking in the vicinity of the crime
The information given the officer was that the burglar was a Negro, had a mus-
tache, and wore a brown coat. The defendant matched this description. In the
course of his investigation, the policeman frisked the suspect and discovered a
knife which was later introduced as evidence at the trial. The Superior Court of
S. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1961).
6. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
8. Weeks v, United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20 (1925).
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961); See also People v. Martin,
46 Cal. 2d 106, 283 P.2d 52 (1956); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458; cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1964).
11. People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1965); Commonwealth v. Ballou,
350 Mass. 751, 217 N.E.2d 187 cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1031 (1966). For a complete dis-
cussion of this area of the law see Schwartz, Stop and Frisk: A Case Study in Judicial
Control of the Police, 58 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 433 (1967); State v. Terry, Ohio App. 2d.
122, 214 N.E.2d 114, 34 Ohio Op. 2d 237 (1966), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 2050 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 201 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (1966).
12. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 U. Pa. L. Rev. 315 (1942).
13. Cal. Pen. Code § 833 (1957); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1902-03 (1953); Hawaii
Rev. Laws, § 2554-5 (1955); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98 (1961); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 544.170 (1959); Neb. Laws ch. 132, at 471 (1965); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 954:2-954:3
(1960); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 12-7-1 to -2 (1956).
14. Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and The Law of Arrest, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1182 (1952).
15. 201 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (1966).
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Pennsylvania declared the search and seizure lawful, although probable cause
was lacking, basing its decision on the need for effective law enforcement and
the need for protection of police officers in the performance of their duties. 6
This decision was rendered in the absence of a statute authorizing such police
action. In State v. Terry,'7 which is currently before the Supreme Court, a po-
liceman observed the defendants behaving in an unusual manner in the early
afternoon. The defendants had been standing on a street corner in downtown
Cleveland. One of them walked down the street and looked into a jewelry store,
He returned to the corner, and the two men spoke to each other. The second
defendant then walked to the same store while the first remained on the corner.
The defendants were joined by a third man and the sequence of events was then
repeated several times. The officer approached the men, stopped and questioned
them, and then frisked them, finding concealed weapons on two of the three.
The court ruled that such police action was "reasonable" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, despite the absence of probable cause. 8 Again, there was
no statute authorizing such conduct. A situation which in some ways resembles
that of the instant case is found in Commonwealth v. Ballou.19 There the police
received an anonymous call, informing them that a certain man standing in
front of a bar was carrying a loaded revolver. The officers proceeded to the
bar and, upon seeing the suspect standing there, frisked him, finding a loaded
weapon. The officers knew before the search that on a previous occasion this
particular man had been convicted of unlawful possession of a gun. In addition,
they had seen his name and picture on certain police circulars several times.
The defendant was convicted and on appeal the court affirmed, saying "We make
no conclusion that there was probable cause for arrest before obtaining proof
of secret possession of the revolver. The point we decide is that the two officers
acted reasonably in the steps taken to avoid being shot down .... ,,20 In 1964,
the New York State Legislature amended the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure to include a section which authorized both the detention and questioning
of persons who are reasonably suspected of certain types of criminal conduct,
and the search of such persons where the detaining officer "reasonably suspects
that he is in danger of life or limb. .... ,,21 In all but one 22 of the leading New
16. Id. at 225, 223 A.2d at 875-76.
17. 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114, 34 Ohio Op. 2d 237 (1966); cert. granted,
87 Sup. Ct. 2050 (1967).
18. Id. at 124-25, 214 N.E.2d at 117-18, 34 Ohio Op. 2d at 239.
19. 350 Mass. 751, 217 N.E.2d 187, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1031 (1966).
20. Id. at 753, 217 N.E.2d at 189-90.
21. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a (1964). The complete statute reads:
(1) A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he
reasonably suspects is committing or is about to commit a felony or any of the
crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two, and may demand of him his
name, address, and an explanation of his actions.
(2) When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this
section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search
such person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or
any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take it
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York cases in this area,23 a distinction was made between a "formal arrest and
full search," which requires reasonable grounds for believing criminal activity
has occurred (probable cause), and what is called a "stop and frisk"-a brief
period of detention and a patting of the exterior of one's clothing, which requires
only reasonable grounds for suspecting criminal conduct (reasonable suspi-
cion) .24 It was said that only the latter is authorized by the statute. The theory
behind this distinction is that objections against unreasonable searches and
seizures are products of our concern with the right to privacy, and a "stop and
frisk," being a somewhat lesser invasion of privacy than an "arrest and search,"
may thus be constitutionally justified by a more easily satisfied standard .2
The leading New York case in the area of "stop and frisk," arising before
the effective date of the statute, is People v. Rivera.20 In that case three de-
tectives, patrolling in an area of high crime at one thirty in the morning, no-
ticed the defendant walking back and forth in front of a bar and frequently
looking inside. This behavior was observed for about five minutes. When the
defendant spotted the officers, he walked away rapidly. One of the detectives
told him to stop, identified himself as an officer and then frisked him, which
resulted in the discovery of a gun. In affirming the conviction, the New York
Court of Appeals stated that:
The constitutional restriction is against unreasonable searches,
not against all searches. What is reasonable always involves a bal-
ancing of interests. Here it is the security of the public and the police
officer against a minor inconvenience and slight indignity. If we recog-
nize this duty of the police we must also recognize its dangers. Frisk
is a reasonable and constitutional means of minimizing this danger.27
The majority held that the stopping and questioning of suspicious individuals
is not tantamount to an arrest, and thus does not require the standard of prob-
able cause for its justification. They also concluded that a frisk is different
and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either
return it if lawfully possessed or arrest such person.
22. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 229 N.E.2d 589, 283 N.YS.2d 1 (1967).
23. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 978 (1964); People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217
(1966); prob. jurik. noted, 386 U.S. 980 (1967); People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219
N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966); prob. juris. noted, 386 U.S. 954 (1967). People v.
Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1964); cert. denied, 380 U.S.
936 (1965).
Pugach has been widely condemned. It is very likely that circumstances outside the
record largely determined the court's decision, and therefore the case should be of little
precedential value. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 436-40. But see People v. Reason, 52
Misc. 2d 425, 436, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196, 207-08 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; People v. Cassesse, 47 Misc. 2d
1031 at 1033-34 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1965).
24. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d at 444, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
25. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d at 245, 219 N.E.2d at 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
26. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.2d 458, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 978 (1964);
Note, $0 Corn. L.Q. 529 (1965).
27. Id. at 444, 201 NXE.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
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from a search, and that, just as the latter is permissible if made incident to a
lawful arrest, so may a frisk be permitted if made incident to a lawful stop.28
The first case to be decided under the New York statute was People v.
Peters.20 There an off-duty police officer discovered the defendant and another
man "tiptoeing about" on the top floor of the apartment house in which the
officer resided. When the defendant heard the officer approaching he turned
and fled down the steps. The officer stopped him and "patted down" his clothing.
He felt something hard in an opaque envelope in the defendant's pocket, and,
thinking it might have been a knife, he removed and examined it. The envelope
was found to contain burglar's tools. The New York Court of Appeals, in re-
affirming the rationale of Rivera, held the search and seizure valid. The majority
said the stopping and frisking of an individual is constitutionally permissible
in a situation involving reasonable suspicion.
30
In People v. Sibron,3 1 decided on the same day as Peters, a police detective
observed defendant talking to known narcotics users at various times throughout
an eight hour period, The officer approached him in a restaurant, indentified
himself as a detective, and requested that defendant accompany him to the
street. Outside the restaurant the officer said to him, "You know what I am
looking for." The defendant immediately reached into his pocket. The detective
intercepted his hand and withdrew from the pocket a package wrapped in tin-
foil, which, upon examination, contained narcotics. The New York Court of
Appeals, in a memorandum decision, affirmed the conviction in the lower court,
basing its decision on the principles set forth in Peters. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Before the case was argued however, the prosecution moved
for dismissal, conceding error as to the findings that the circumstances justified
a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, and that the officer's fear of per-
sonal danger was reasonable. Therefore, both probable cause and reasonable
suspicion being absent, the search and seizure could not be constitutionally
justified. As of the time of this writing, no ruling on the motion has been an-
nounced,
The constitutional validity of the New York statute presents at least two
very distinct questions, First, is there a legal distinction between the detention
authorized by section 180-a and a formal arrest? If this is answered in the
negative, then the New York law is clearly unconstitutional because, in effect,
it authorizes the arrest of persons absent probable cause. If, however, there is
a legal distinction between a "stop" and an "arrest," and if the former is per-
mitted upon a showing of "reasonable suspicion," a second question arises as
to whether a frisk will also be permitted upon such a showing. The Supreme
28. Id. at 443, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
29. 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966), prob. juri. noted, 87
Sup. Ct. 1291 (1967); Note, 35 Ford. L. Rev. 359 (1966).
30. Id. at 242, 219 N.E.2d at 600, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
31. 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 NXE.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966); prob. juris, noted,
386 U.S. 954 (1967); Note, 33 Brooklyn L. Rev. 38 (1966).
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Court of, the United States has never passed upon the constitutionality of the
frisk authorized by these statutes and state court decisions, nor, prior to Peters,
Sibron, and Terry, had it the opportunity to do so. It has on two occasions,
however, been presented with the question of the legality of police detention in
the absence of probable cause.
In Henry v. United States8 2 the Court held the mere stopping of defendant's
car constituted an arrest, and, probable cause being absent at that time, both
the arrest and seizure were unlawful. 83 Throughout this case however, the
prosecution conceded, and the Court accepted the concession, that the arrest
occurred at the moment the defendant was stopped by the officers. Therefore
the question of whether there can be a lawful detention that does not amount
to a formal arrest was not before the Court, and was not decided. Two justices
dissented, arguing that an arrest did not occur the moment the defendant was
stopped for questioning, and that the majority erred in accepting the prosecu-
tion's concession to the contrary.34 In the only other Supreme Court case to
approach this problem,35 police officers, without probable cause for arrest,
stopped the defendant and in the course of their investigation discovered a
package of narcotics. 36 The Court remanded the case for a determination of
the exact point at which the arrest occurred. It is significant that although the
opportunity was afforded, the Court did not rule that every detention is an
arrest and thus, to be lawful, must be accompanied by probable cause. The
most that can be said of this case in reference to the constitutionality of a
"stop" without probable cause, however, is that perhaps every detention does
not constitute an arrest.3T Although a final ruling by the Supreme Court is
yet to come, there are several federal court decisions in which the power to
stop and question, based upon facts and circumstances not amounting to prob-
able cause, has been upheld.3 8 In United States v. Vita, 9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that an eight hour period of
detention, for the purpose of investigation did not constitute a formal arrest.40
Although the defendant had submitted to the investigation voluntarily, the
court stated that
even if Vita had been involuntarily detained for questioning . . . we
would not necessarily hold such detention to be an "arrest" within
the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a). The rule
32. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
33. Id. at 103.
34. Id. at 104.
35. United States v. Rios, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
36. The record is unclear as to the precise series of events which followed,
37. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and The Law of Arrest, 54 J. Crim. L., C., &
P.S. 393, 395 (1963).
38. United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823
(1962) (dictum); United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States
v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
39. 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962) (dictum),
40. 1. at 529.
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does not apply to a case in which federal officers detain a suspect for
a short and reasonable period in order to question him.41
In United States v. Bonnano,42 the court, in concluding that the detention in-
volved in the case was not an arrest, said that "every temporary restriction of
absolute freedom of movement is not an illegal police action demanding sup-
pression of all resultant evidence .... ,,43
In the instant case the court admitted that probable cause for arrest was
absent and, therefore, that a search made incident to an arrest would have been
violative of the protections guaranteed by the fourth amendment. The majority
concluded, however, that notwithstanding the absence of probable cause, the
search was justified under the New York "stop and frisk" statute.44 The anony-
mous telephone call, coupled with the presence of a youth who "matched per-
fectly" the description given by the informant, was sufficient to warrant a
reasonable suspicion in the mind of the officer that a crime was being com-
mitted.45 The presence of a youth who was reasonably suspected of possessing
a loaded pistol in the midst of a group of children created a situation which not
only justified detention of some sort, but clearly demanded it.46 That being
so, the officer, pursuant to the statute, had the authority to search appellant and
remove the revolver from his jacket.47 The court rejected the notion, expressed
in the earlier New York cases, that the constitutionality of the search authorized
by the statute must hinge upon the distinction between a "frisk" and a "search."
It pointed out that although in prior cases convictions were affirmed upon
findings that frisks, rather than searches, had been made, the factual situations
actually supported a contrary conclusion.48 In other words, the conduct per-
mitted by the statute need not, either by the language of the statute itself or
by prior case law, be limited to a patting of the exterior of one's clothing. The
majority did suggest, however, that barring unusual circumstances such as
were present in the instant case, where a preparatory frisk would have been
unduly dangerous to both the officer and the children in the area, the search
allowed by section 180-a should be limited to a frisk.49
In a concurring opinion 50 Judge Van Voorhis stressed the need for police
action where the circumstances pose a threat of serious harm to human lives.
In such situations the substitution of the standard "reasonable suspicion" for
"probable cause" is entirely proper. The instant case falls well within this
41. Id.
42. 180 F. Supp. 71 (SD.N.Y. 1960).
43. Id. at 78.
44. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d at 337, 229 N.E.2d at 582, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
45. Id. at 337, 339, 229 N.E.2d at 582, 584, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 3, 5.
46. Id. at 341, 229 N.E.2d at 584, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
47. Id. at 341, 229 N.E.2d at 585, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
48. Id. at 342, 229 N.E.2d at 586, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
49. Id. at 342-43, 229 N.E.2d at 586, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
50. Id. at 343, 229 N.E.2d at 587, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
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category;5 1 a loaded revolver is obviously a potentially dangerous object. He
suggested, however, that since the sole justification for the search under the
New York statute is the possibility of harm to the officer from a concealed
weapon upon the person being detained, such person should be neither arrested
nor convicted unless the fruits of the search are in fact a weapon. Although
concurring in the decision here, he disagreed with the decisions in the Sibron
and Peters cases.
5 2
Chief Judge Fuld, dissenting,5 3 stated that "settled constitutional doctrine"
demands a finding of probable cause in order to sustain the validity of a search
and seizure. Probable cause being absent (as was conceded by the majority),
the search and seizure were constitutionally prohibited. The dissent recognized
the duty of the officer, under these facts, to stop and question the appellant,
but rejected the majority's finding that the imminency of danger required
the officer to search the defendant. He maintained that such police action must
be limited to situations involving either probable cause or immediate and grave
danger to human life, neither of which, he believed, was present in the instant
case.
5 4
It is apparent that the scope of permissible police activity authorized by
section 180-a is extended by this decision. In Rivera, Peters, and Sibron the ma-
jority concluded that the "search" permitted by section 180-a is limited to a
frisk. The statute, as construed here, authorizes not only a frisk, but, under
certain circumstances, an actual search of a suspect as well. In effect, then, the
court held that under the New York statute, probable cause is not necessary
for every lawful search and seizure. The instant case presents a problem with
which the courts have been struggling for some time. That there is a need for
greater efficiency in the area of law enforcement and greater protection for law
enforcement officers cannot be denied. Such needs, however, may not be used
to justify an abrogation of constitutional requirements. To do so is to under-
mine the very safety and security which is sought to be protected. Nevertheless,
as we are reminded in Rivera, the constitutional prohibitions against search and
seizure extend only to unreasonable ones, and what is reasonable is largely
determined by balancing the competing interests.55 The New York statute,
when properly limited, appears to be a rational and sorely needed compromise
between these interests. The stopping of an individual for a brief period of
investigation is a necessary and relatively harmless exercise of police power.
Without this authority the ability of police officers to inquire into suspicious
activity would be seriously affected. The argument that a "stop" is significantly
different than an "arrest" has merit, and finds ample support in both the
51. Id. at 343-44, 229 N.E.2d at 587, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
52. Id. at 344, 229 N.E.2d at 587, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 345, 229 N.E.2d at 588, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
55. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d at 441, 201 N.E.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S. at 462.
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caseses and the literature.47 It follows, therefore, that a showing of probable
cause should not be necessary in order to justify a "stop., The distinction made
in the earlier New York cases between a "frisk" and a "search," however, is
at best tenuous; it is "'The slightest touching' which is condemned . . . this is
... as objectionable ... in the one case as in the other."58 Still, if we are to
recognize the duty of an officer to inquire into suspicious activity, we must also
recognize the dangers involved, and provide him with procedures whereby he
can reduce these dangers. The frisk is just such a procedure. Critics of section
180-a argue that the standard of "reasonable suspicion" has not the same
capacity for objectivity as had "probable cause." 59 It follows that since the
standard, by its very nature, is not susceptible to objective judicial testing, the
legality of police action founded upon "a reasonable suspicion" will likewise
be incapable of testing. The end result will be police conduct free from any
judicial restraint. It is submitted that this argument ignores the realities of any
legal standards which incorporate the concept of "reasonableness." It is doubt-
ful that anyone would seriously contend that either "reasonable suspicion" or
"probable cause (reasonable belief)," by themselves, possess any meaningful
degree of objectivity. What makes "probable cause" a judicially workable
standard is the many previous court decisions declaring which factual situations
are, and which are not, sufficient to constitute probable cause. The difficulties
that critics have with the standard of "reasonable suspicion" arise only because,
as yet, the law in this area is undeveloped-the standard has only recently been
introduced into American courts.60 Once developed, there will of course be
cases which fall near the perimeter of the standard. Such cases will be no more
troublesome than are those arising under the already established standard
of probable cause-a standard with which the courts have been working ef-
fectively.
The more frequent objection to the New York statute,61 and one with
more substance, is that it authorizes the search of an individual in the absence
of probable cause. The fear is that under pretense of a "reasonable suspicion
of personal danger," police will engage in indiscriminate searches of persons
in order to obtain evidence of unlawful activity, and will then invoke the
statute to avoid the exclusionary rule of Mapp. The danger of abuse, although
very real, can be reduced by eliminating the incentive for abuse. The ex-
56. See cases cited in supra notes 38, 10, 11.
57. See Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law and Its Claimed
Unconstitutionality, 56 J. Crim. L., C., & P.S. 32 (1965); Leagre, supra, note 37; Ronayne,
The Right to Investigate and New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 211
(1964); but see Foote, The Fourth Amejdment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of
Arrest,5 1 J. Crim. L., C., & P.S. 251 (1966).
58. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d at 445, 201 N.E.2d at 37, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (dis-
senting opinion of Fuld, J.).
59. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 447-48; see also Foote, supra note 57, at 403-05.
60. The standard of "reasonable suspicion" has been in existence since early English
common law. J, Hale, Pleas of the Crown 88, 97 (C. Wilson ed. 1800).
61. J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, 212-19 (1966).
945
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clusionary rule was formulated in order to discourage police from engaging in
searches in the absence of probable cause. By ruling that evidence so obtained
could not be admitted at a trial against the person from whom it was seized,
the Supreme Court effectively curtailed such police conduct. Similarly, if the
courts, where a search pursuant to section 180-a is involved, were to limit the
objects which could be admitted into evidence to weapons only, as Judge Van
Voorhis suggested,6 2 they would eliminate much of the incentive to misuse the
powers granted by the statute. Without this limitation, the fourth amendment
will be denied effect.
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HARvEY M. PULLMAN
EVIDENCE-MEDrA. TREATISES To BE ADMITTED AS INDEPENDENT
EVIDENCE AS AN EXCEPTION TO TnE HEARSAY Rury.
Plaintiff and defendant were the drivers of two automobiles involved in an
accident. As a result of the accident, an operation known as ankylosis had to be
performed on the plaintiff at which time two ruptured discs from his spine were
removed and the vertebrae fused together with bone from the hip. The plaintiff
brought an action to recover damages for the personal injuries sustained. At the
trial, plaintiff's medical expert testified on direct examination that in his opinion
the operation resulted in a permanent twenty per cent impairment of the spine
and ten per cent disability of the whole body generally. On cross examination,
plaintiff's expert was asked if he were familiar with the American Medical Asso-
ciation's Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment of the Extremities
and Back.1 He replied in the affirmative, but that he had not consulted the Guide
in making his own estimate of the disability and that he was not familiar with
what the Guide set for the operation. Defense counsel then asked his own medical
expert if he knew what standard of disability the Guide set for ankylosis of two
vertebrae. Plaintiff's objection to this question was sustained on the ground that
to admit the contents of the Guide directly would violate the hearsay rule, and
since plaintiff's medical expert testified that he had not consulted the Guide in
making his estimate of disability, the proper basis for admitting the contents of
the Guide to impeach plaintiff's expert did not exist. There was a verdict and
judgment for plaintiff on the negligence issue and the defendant appealed, assign-
ing the trial court's refusal to allow defendant's expert to answer the disputed
question as one source of error. Held, by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, it was
62. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y. at 344, 229 N.E.2d at 587, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (con-
curring opinion of Van Voorhis, J.).
63. Silver Rome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
1. JAM.A. (spec. ed. Feb. 15, 1958) [hereinafter cited as Guide]. The Guide, a collec-
tion of percentage disability tables based on objective measurements of restriction of motion,
sets limits of 3 to 7 per cent spinal impairment and 2 to 4 per cent overall bodily impairment
for ankylosis of any two cervical vertebrae. Guide 89, 103.
